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In this paper, we test the Coase theorem in the context of carbon emissions trading. 
We investigate whether generating firms were influenced in their operational decisions 
by the initial amount of grandfathered emissions in the trial period of the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). Theory suggests that under certain assumptions, 
the initial allocation should not affect production outcomes. We exploit a non-linearity in 
the allocation rule of CO2 allowances across coal plants in Spain to test for the relevance 
of the initial allocation to abatement outcomes. The evidence suggests no systematic 
relationship between the initial endowment and production decisions at the unit level.
                                                 
1  Reguant (mreguant@mit.edu) is a Ph.D. student at the MIT Economics Department and Ellerman 
(ellerman@mit.edu) is a Senior Lecturer with Sloan School of Management. We thank Nancy Rose for 
helpful advice. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1. Introduction 
One of the enduring issues in cap-and-trade systems is whether the free allocation of 
allowances to affected facilities distorts the operations of those units. It is clear that free 
allowances improve the profitability of the units so endowed, but as long as the 
endowment does not change according to the facility’s output or emissions, the lump-sum 
endowment should have no effect on operations. Given that the allowances can be sold in 
the market, operators should recognize the full opportunity cost involved in emitting a 
unit of emissions in the same manner as they would if they had not been allocated 
allowances for free and had to purchase them in the market or at an auction  
This independence of operations and allocation, first developed by Coase (1960), has 
enormous distributive implications. Among other things, it allows for considerations of 
equity and efficiency to be separated in cap-and-trade systems. Widely varying 
distributions that can respond to non-economic criteria can be implemented without 
harming economic efficiency. The counter-argument and the concern has always been 
that the initial allocation affects operational decisions. By this reasoning, allocating fewer 
allowances to an affected unit will lead to less production independently of the market 
price of allowances.  
There are several reasons why the independence of the initial allocation of allowances 
and production decisions might not hold. For example, the presence of transaction costs 
and imperfections in the market for allowances might invalidate the independence result. 
A prominent example is the presence of market power in the permits market. Cost-of-
service regulation can also lead to different results than those expected under the classical 
Coasian assumptions. Fowlie (2007) finds evidence of this latter regulatory effect in the 
context of the NOx cap-and-trade program. 
Endogeneity has made testing the Coasian result of the independence of operations 
and allocation difficult, if not impossible, in most cases. The initial allocation tends to 
reflect past production or emissions, which are clear determinants of current output or 
emissions. Failing to control for the endogeneity of the allocation rule can lead to the 
misleading conclusion that the allocation has an impact on production decisions, given 
that past and current emissions are highly correlated. Fowlie and Perloff (2008) are able 
to overcome this problem by using a random factor in the allocation of allowances in the 
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NOx RECLAIM program for the Los Angeles Basin.2  They are unable to find any 
endowment effect, thereby providing evidence that, at least in that particular market, the 
Coasian assumption applies.  
The Spanish allocation of allowances in the EU-ETS offers a similar uncorrelated 
effect. Coal-fired electricity generating units were allocated allowances according to 
historical emissions, but with a quadratic adjustment that rewarded cleaner generating 
units. Those units with relatively lower emissions rates were given more allowances 
compared to similar units with higher than average emission rates. This quadratic term 
introduces a variation in the initial allocation to Spanish coal-fired generating units that is 
linearly independent of past emissions. Under some assumptions, this allows for another 
test of whether the initial allocation has an effect on operations.  
In this case, it is also important to control for the effect of carbon prices on 
operational decisions. Given that cleaner units incur relatively lower cost of CO2 
emissions, they might be expected to produce more as a result of the introduction of the 
European Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), the same consequence that 
could be posited if allocation had an effect on operational decisions. In the case of Spain 
and given this particular allocation rule, failing to control for the price effect could lead 
us to conclude that there is evidence of an allocation effect. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss in greater 
detail how the permits were allocated in Spain, and look at some other institutional 
details that are relevant for our analysis. In section 3, we describe the data used in our 
empirical application. In section 4 the model is presented and the results are discussed. 
Section 5 concludes with the main findings. 
                                                 
2  Fowlie and Perloff take advantage of the fact that facilities were randomly assigned to two 
different allocation cycles, which introduces temporal variation in the facility level permit allocations. 
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2. The allocation rule 
The allowances in the trial period of the Emissions Trading Scheme were allocated 
mainly by a grandfathering mechanism. More than 95% of the permits were given for 
free to polluting units by each government, while less than 5% were auctioned. 
Therefore, a need arose to set the rules that would determine how many allowances each 
unit would be entitled. The National Allocation Plan (NAP) of each participating country 
established the amount of emissions that would be grandfathered to each industrial sector, 
as well as the allocation rule that would be used to distribute those permits across units, 
based on several criteria.  
As in many other countries, Spain put a considerable weight of the reduction of 
emissions on the electricity sector, with a resulting initial allocation well below Business-
As-Usual (BAU) projections. Not surprisingly, the electricity sector in Spain became a 
net demander of allowances, this being true for almost every type of thermal technology 
in aggregate. At the individual level, the balance was negative for most coal and oil 
units3. Combined cycle units had either excess or deficit of allowances4. 
The NAP in Spain was also characterized by an uneven allocation across thermal 
units, differentiated not only by the three broad types of technology -coal, oil and gas-, 
but also, to some extent, by the differential efficiency across units within the same 
technology. Coal units were given the allocation according to their production in the 
baseline period, corrected by their relative efficiency including a quadratic term based on 
the emissions rate. Oil units were given substantially less emission allowances than 
needed, based on their baseline emissions. Given that most combined cycle units were 
not constructed in the baseline period, they were given emission allowances according to 
a benchmark emissions rate of 0.365 tons of CO2/MWh and expected production, taking 
into account their predicted available capacity. To sum it up, the initial allocation of 
permits to thermal plants in the electricity sector depended on baseline emissions in 
2000-2002, the emissions rate and the available capacity of each unit. 
                                                 
3  There are two units that got divested and thus did not use fully their allowances. 
4  Given the large amount of new entry in the combined-cycle sector, oftentimes the divergence 
arises due to a difference between the predicted time of construction of the unit and the actual time of 
initiation of operations. 
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a. The non-linear allocation to coal 
In this paper, we focus our attention on coal units and exploit a non-linearity in the 
allocation rule. As detailed in Del Rio (2007), the allocation to coal units was done using 
the following quadratic formula: 
∑×= j jj
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where ia is the individual allocation, coalA  the overall coal allocation, ix  are baseline 
emissions and iy is the emissions rate. The allocation was further constrained to be at 
least 55% of the baseline emissions. The rationale behind this rule is that the government 
decided to reward those units that were more environmentally efficient by granting them 
more free allowances than dirtier plants. 
We do not observe exactly the emissions rate that was used in the NAP, but we 
observe the baseline emissions of each plant, which allows us to compute their average 
emissions rate. Given our average emissions rates during the baseline period, we re-
construct the rule to test how well we succeed in explaining the differences in the 
allocation rule. In figure 1, we represent our re-constructed rule against the actual 
allocation. According to our observed data, the rule was followed accurately by the 
authorities, taking into account that our data do not exactly match the ones used in the 
NAP.5 Therefore, we can rely on the specification of the rule as the cornerstone to build 
our empirical strategy, and use the re-constructed rule as an instrument for the allocation 
itself. 
The fact that there is a clear allocation rule for coal plants opens the door to 
potentially identify the endowment effect in this group of plants, as long as we succeed in 
controlling for other aspects of these plants that affect their production decisions and are 
correlated with their emissions rate, which enters the allocation rule non-linearly. Under 
appropriate identifying assumptions, we can consider part of the variation in the 
allocation rule to be exogenous and use this fact to explore whether the initial allocation 
systematically affected the production of the units. 
                                                 
5  There are two observations that lie further away from our predicted rule. These are units that have 
measured emissions rates that are significantly different from benchmark estimates of their type of 
technology. It might be that the government used different estimates than the ones in our data set, or that 
the allocation differed due to some other unobserved factors. 
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The basic identifying assumption is based on the fact that the marginal cost of the 
allowances has a relationship that is primarily linear with the emissions rate. We assume 
that the non-linear effect of the emissions rate in the allocation rule affects production 
choices only through its influence on the initial allocation. Even though this is a strong 
assumption, it is common to treat the costs of pollution as being linear in the level of 
production, as emissions are strongly correlated with the use of inputs. In many instances, 
and absent actual measurements of emissions at the unit level, it is common to use 
benchmark emissions rates to compute an estimate of total emissions, by simply 
multiplying the emissions rate with total electricity produced in a linear fashion.  
b. Other institutional details 
The particularities of the Spanish electricity sector make it relevant to consider other 
potential institutional features that might have affected the allocation decisions. Among 
these, we pay special attention to national subsidies to coal production. On the one hand, 
if the subsidized quota equals the annual production for most units, we might expect coal 
units not to react at all to the introduction of the EU-ETS, but rather to produce only their 
subsidized quantity.  
For this reason, we have collected a data set containing the subsidized quotas of each 
plant, as well as their annual production. According to our data, the proportion of 
subsidized coal varies considerably across units. There are some plants that only operate 
with imported coal, which do not receive any subsidies. Other plants are given a subsidy 
of at most 60% of their potential annual production, and, on average, 35%. In practice, 
this implies that units cover on average around 50% of their actual production with the 
subsidies.  
Still, the national subsidies to production can have an impact on the overall 
production decisions at the unit level. They represent a reduction of the cost of the units 
that receive those subsidies, which makes them more attractive relative to those plants 
that operate with imported coal and receive no subsidies at all. Therefore, we include the 
quota of each unit in the analysis. 
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3. The data 
We use a newly constructed data set that contains daily electricity generation at the 
unit level for Spanish thermal technology from 2002 to 20066. This data set contains both 
MWh produced at a given day, as well as unit available capacity net of forced outages 
and planned shut downs. We combine these data with other market outcomes, such as the 
day-ahead and final electricity prices, CO2 prices and aggregate output by other types of 
technology. We also collect characteristics at the unit level: maximum available capacity, 
type of fuel used7, vintage, generating company, geographic location, and subsidized 
national quota. 
Together with production and characteristics at the unit level, we have annual 
information on CO2 emissions at the plant level8 from the National Register, for the years 
2001-2004. These data are merged with the emissions data during the EU-ETS trial 
period 2005-2007. We estimate emissions rates at the plant level for each year, by 
dividing total emissions by total output at the annual level. Emissions rates do not 
fluctuate much at the unit level and are consistent with typical fuel benchmark emissions 
for the generation plants involved. Therefore, they are strongly correlated across units 
that use the same fuel. Among coal units, imported coal plants have the lowest emissions 
rate around 0.90 tons/MWh, whereas lignite units are the dirtiest with an emissions rate 
ranging 1.00 to 1.10 tons/MWh. We use the average emissions rate for each unit.  
We focus on generation decisions for coal units in our empirical strategy to identify 
the effect of the initial endowment. We construct a measure that normalizes the grand-
fathered allocation, to capture how the relative allocation across units differed. We do 
this so that the main source of endogeneity in the rule, the baseline emissions, is 
cancelled out. We define the relative allocation iγ  as: 
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6  Data are publicly available at the system and market operator websites, www.esios.ree.es and 
www.omel.es.  
7  The input types are combined cycle, oil, imported coal, anthracite coal, black lignite and brown 
lignite, following the categorization in the Annual Statistics by Red Eléctrica Española. 
8  A plant is composed by one or more units. In the data set, the largest plant contains four units. 
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where ia  represents the allocated permits, ix  stands for the total number of emissions in 
the baseline period 2000-2002 and iy  is an emissions factor. Thus, if all plants had been 
given permits proportionally, then the relative allocation iγ  would equal one for all units 
and we would have no variation in the data. We can also interpret this variable as a 
normalized ratio of how many permits a unit was given relative to the needed permits to 
produce as BAU, according to the baseline period. As highlighted by equation (2), iγ  is 
inversely related to the emissions rate. 
In figure 2 we can visually check that the data set reflects the quadratic nature of the 
allocation rule. We observe that cleaner units are given more pollution permits than if the 
rule had been proportional to baseline emissions, whereas dirtier plants are punished with 
less grandfathered permits. There are several reasons for the rule not fitting exactly into 
the non-linear pattern. On the one hand, we do not observe the exact baseline emissions 
that were used to compute the allocation, but have to reconstruct it from the observed 
data. On the other hand, there might have been some minor departures from the rule 
based on other criteria that we do not observe. We use therefore the re-constructed rule to 
instrument for the actual allocation, to address the possible endogeneity that might be left 
in the actual allocation rule. 
Summary statistics for the coal units in our data set are presented in Table 1. In this 
table, we compare the characteristics of units with iγ  either below or above one.  There 
are eight plants with iγ  smaller than one, and eleven plants that are given more permits 
than proportional, totaling 19 plants, which are composed by a total of 36 units. The type 
of coal that they use is correlated with their emissions factor. For example, lignite and 
anthracite units pollute more than imported coal units. Given the nature of the rule, the 
emissions rate of units with gamma lower than one, which are dirtier, is considerably 
higher than the one for clean coal plants. We also observe that the efficiency of the units 
is related to other characteristics.  Cleaner units are smaller in size and produce less on 
average. However, their utilization rate is higher. In our econometric specification, we 
control for these aspects mainly in the form of a unit-specific fixed effect. 
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4. Model and Results 
a. Model 
We model the choice of a coal unit deciding whether to produce or not on a given 
day. We represent generating utilities providing supply of electricity in a day-ahead 
wholesale electricity market on a daily basis. Given that generating units produce on 
those days in which their opportunity cost are below the market price, the decision to 
produce or not on a given day is a function of the expected average price for that day as 
well as the opportunity costs that the unit incurs in doing so.  
The decision can be represented with the following inequality: 
 
⎩⎨
⎧ +++≥=
otherwise    0
       if     1 ititiitt
it
uEUAecp
on
θγ
 (3) 
where  
tp      = daily electricity price 
itc      = marginal cost for a given unit 
ie       = emissions rate at the plant level 
tEUA = daily cost of the CO2 allowances weighted by unit emissions rate 
iγ       = relative allocation variable at the unit level 
itu      = other opportunity costs for a given unit 
 
A given unit switches on as long as its total opportunity cost is below the price in the 
market. The opportunity cost depends on the cost of the inputs, as well as some other 
factors that could affect decisions at the unit level. Note that if agents internalize the cost 
of the emissions, this opportunity cost also includes the cost of the emissions, as 
highlighted by the above expression. Therefore, we expect daily production decisions to 
be correlated with the pollution costs of the units, as well as the market price in the 
market. We also include our initial allocation variable to see how it affects production 
choices. Under the Coasian assumptions, it should have no effect on the opportunity cost, 
which implies 0=θ . 
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If agents are rational, one should observe firms fully internalizing the cost of the 
emissions. This is a necessary condition for the Coase theorem to hold, given that the 
market mechanism will lead to an efficient outcome as long as the units internalize the 
costs of the environmental externality. Because the market for CO2 permits is European 
wide, the permits market can be considered to be perfectly competitive. Under the 
additional assumption of no transaction costs and rational agents, production choices 
should not be affected by the initial allocation of permits. 
The presence of transaction costs could affect the production decisions and thus break 
the independence between the initial allocation and the final outcome.  In this sense, the 
opportunity cost of using a particular unit is relatively higher if the firm has to acquire the 
permits in the market, and does not have them for free. The transaction cost is going to be 
negatively related to the initial amount of grandfathered emissions, and could effectively 
increase the output of units that benefited the most from the grandfathering process.  
If firms internalize the transactions costs when using their grandfathered permits, the 
presence of transaction cost increases the average cost of the emissions, and this increase 
is correlated with the size of the initial allocation. In this case, a firm incorporates the 
expected transaction costs since the beginning of the year, as it understands that by using 
grandfathered permits today it will not be able to use them in future stages of the year. 
Units with a more favorable allocation then face a relatively lower opportunity cost than 
the others overall. 
Other theories that break the Coasian equivalence result, such as a behavioral 
endowment effect, predict similar results. The general conclusion is that, if the initial 
allocation matters, it tends to increase the production of those units that benefited the 
most from the initial endowment, in detriment of the production generated by other units. 
Given that iγ  is a relative measure that is positively related to the amount of 
grandfathered allowances, an endowment effect in our model is captured by 0<θ  in 
equation (3): units with a more favorable allocation face a relatively smaller opportunity 
cost than other units, all else equal9. 
                                                 
9  Following the example with transaction costs, a more generous initial allocation diminishes part of 
the transaction costs of acquiring permits in the market, thus lowering the relative opportunity cost of the 
unit. 
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Re-writing expression (3), we derive the following relationship when a unit switches 
on: 
ititit EUAep ξγβββ ≥++ 321  (4) 
where itξ  represents the variable cost of the unit without the effects of the EU-ETS, 
which equals  in expression (3). itit uc +
The implications of the model on the parameters above are twofold: 
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In the first hypothesis H1, firms internalize the cost of the emissions fully and 
incorporate the cost when choosing their production decisions. As explained above, this 
is a necessary condition for achieving the efficient abatement outcome, but not sufficient. 
In the second hypothesis H2, we test whether the initial allocation had a significant effect 
on production outcomes, by assessing whether it significantly increased or decreased the 
opportunity cost of using a given unit over all the EU-ETS period.  
b. Base case specification  
We model the production decisions in reduced form, as depending on several 
variables that might determine the usage of a given plant, as suggested by the model 
above. We observe production outcomes at the unit level on a daily basis. From the 
outlined model, we expect a particular unit to switch on if the average price for a 
particular day is sufficiently high. In the presence of the EU-ETS, this probability is 
going to be correlated to the cost of the emissions if firms internalize this cost 
appropriately, implying that higher costs of emissions makes switching on a dirty coal 
plant less likely. 
In our baseline specification, we evaluate a linear probability model in which we 
represent the probability of a unit being switched on  as follows:  
 
(5) itttiitititit qEUAepon εςϖμβγβββ +++++++= 4321  
where  
tp      = daily electricity price 
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ie       = emissions rate at the plant level 
tEUA = daily cost of the CO2 allowances weighted by unit emissions rate 
iγ       = relative allocation variable at the unit level 
itq      = relative quota of at the plant level 
iμ       = unit fixed-effect 
tϖ       = weekday fixed-effect 
tς       = year-month fixed-effects 
 
Note that the time fixed-effects are important to capture other elements that affect 
production decisions and are not included in the model. One of the most relevant omitted 
variables is the price of gas and coal, which affects the relative order of coal units in the 
supply curve. Other relevant variables such as rainfall, which affects the production 
frontier of hydraulic units and, thus, might affect production strategies of each firm, are 
also captured by these controls. Monthly and yearly controls capture the variation in these 
variables, given that input prices and rainfall seasonality do not tend to fluctuate abruptly 
within a month. 
The results for two different specifications are presented in table 2.1.  We observe 
that the coefficients on the price and the cost of the allowances are very similar, with 
opposite sign. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that both coefficients are of the same 
magnitude. The F-test values for this test are below 1 in all of the specifications, which 
corresponds to a p-value around 0.75. These results provide evidence that firms did 
internalize the cost of the emissions fully during this period, passing it through to the 
prices in the electricity market, as one would expect from profit-maximizing agents. 
The results also show that there is no strong evidence that the initial allocation 
variable had an effect on production outcomes. The effect is positive in the two 
specifications, albeit not significant. These results suggest that there is no strong or clear 
relationship between the initial allocation and production outcomes. The national 
subsidies do significantly increase the probability of a firm running in a given day. This 
variable is significant in all specifications and has the expected sign. The subsidy 
effectively reduces the opportunity cost of the units, which produce more often than units 
with relatively lower production subsidies, all else equal. 
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In table 2.2, we instrument for the allocation rule with the re-constructed rule. We 
observe that the instrument reduces the effect of the initial allocation. This is an intuitive 
result.  If there is some endogeneity left in the allocation rule, which is unobserved, it will 
tend to be correlated with production at the unit level. This will overestimate the 
endowment effect. Using the instrument reduces the coefficient on the endowment 
variable towards zero, as the endogenous part of the allocation is removed.  
c. Instrumental variables  
Given the possible endogeneity of electricity prices, we construct a series of 
instruments based on weather data. The effect of weather on price is driven by its impact 
on electricity consumption, which we capture by looking at weather data in capital cities 
in Spain in different regions of the Peninsula. Electricity prices are correlated with 
weather data, which provides a valid first stage for the wholesale price. Our exclusion 
restriction is that production choices respond to weather changes only through its effects 
on price.  
In regression 3.1 we present results from a first stage regression of prices on these 
weather data, in which we use temperature and humidity levels in the city of Madrid10. 
The price at the electricity market is regressed on daily mean temperatures, as well as 
maximum and minimum temperatures and humidity, after partialling out the rest of the 
regressors in our base case specification. Weather is effectively a strong predictor of 
prices, as presented in table 3.1., with an F value of 13.41. This provides a clean 
instrumental variables strategy to address the endogeneity concerns in our base case 
regression. One can see that the relationships are as expected. Extreme temperatures 
increase the market price, whereas average temperature has a negative impact on price11. 
Humidity does not seem to separately explain the variation in prices. 
The results for the two specifications of the base case using instrumental variables are 
presented in table 3.2., in which we also instrument for the allocation rule. The 
coefficient on price is very close to the one on the cost, with the opposite sign. Again, we 
cannot reject that those coefficients are equal, supporting the hypothesis that firms 
internalized the cost of the emissions fully. The coefficient on the initial allocation is 
                                                 
10  Including weather measures from other cities does not change the results of our estimation. 
11  In Spain, electricity demand is higher in average in the winter season than in the summer season. 
13 
 
closer to zero than in the previous specifications, and the national subsidies are still 
significant and of the expected sign. In our preferred specification, in which we 
instrument for both prices and the initial allocation, the coefficient on gamma is very 
close to zero, providing evidence that the grandfathered permits did not affect production 
choices of electric utilities. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the question of whether generating firms in the 
Spanish electricity wholesale market were affected by their initial allocation of 
allowances. Given the endogeneity of the allocation rule, we have focused on the coal 
units, for which the allocation design, which rewarded cleaner units proportionately 
more, introduced some variation. After controlling for the price effect of the carbon price 
on production choices, a re-constructed allocation rule could be used as an instrument for 
the actual initial allocation. We have looked at how the initial allocation affected 
production decisions by looking at how it induced deviations in the utilization of the units 
with a linear probability model. 
We presented two hypotheses. Under a Coasian framework, firms should internalize 
the cost of the emissions fully (H1). Furthermore, the initial allocation should not matter 
(H2). Under the alternative hypothesis, firms would internalize the cost of the emissions 
partially and the initial allocation could have a positive impact on production decisions, 
the so-called endowment effect. The evidence shows that there is not a strong relationship 
between the initial allocation and production decisions. Furthermore, we cannot reject 
that firms internalized the cost of the emissions fully.  
The implications of this finding are in line with previous results in the literature, as 
we do not find evidence against the validity of the Coase theorem in this permit market. 
Results suggest that, under certain conditions such as a functioning competitive trading 
mechanism and profit-maximizing firms, a separation between efficiency and 
distributional aspects when designing a cap-and-trade program is feasible. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of plants depending on their relative allocation in 2001-2007 
 
 
Dirty Clean  
Overall γγValues  < 1  > 1 
Average emissions factor 
(tCO2/MWh) 1.04 0.92 0.97 
Primary type of coal used HA, LN, LP HA, LN, CI - 
Average max available capacity (MW) 633 581 603 
Average annual production (GWh) 4101 3631 3829 
Average running percentage (%) 71 76 74 
Average availability (%) 88 91 90 
Observations  at the unit level 16,060 22,995 78,511 
Observation at the plant level 8,395 12,045 20,440 
 
Notes: HA = Anthracite, LN = Black Lignite, LP = Brown Lignite, CI = Imported Coal. 
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Table 2.1: Base case On/Off  linear probability model 
(1) (2)   
price 0.046 0.046
(5.53)** (5.52)** 
e*EUAt -0.042 -0.042
(2.71)* (2.71)* 
gamma 0.169 0.103
(0.68) (0.58) 
rquota 0.665
(2.87)** 
Weekday FE? YES YES 
Month FE? YES YES 
Year FE? YES YES 
Observations 65,736 65,736
Number of id 36 36
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered at the unit level 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2.2: Base case with re-constructed rule as instrument 
(1) (2)   
price 0.046 0.046
(5.64)** (5.64)** 
e*EUAt -0.043 -0.043
(2.87)** (2.85)** 
gamma 0.104 0.055
(0.39) (0.37) 
rquota 0.670
(2.85)** 
Weekday FE? YES YES 
Month FE? YES YES 
Year FE? YES YES 
Observations 65,736 65,736
Number of id 36 36
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered at the unit level 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 3.1: IV On/Off  linear probability model – First stage 
 
 price   
Temp -0.126 (6.79)**
Max_temp 0.081 (6.38)**
Min_temp 0.042 (3.65)**
Humidity -0.002 (0.82)
Observations 1,793
F 13.41
Other exogenous variables are partialled out 
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered at the unit level 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: IV On/Off  linear probability model 
 
(1) (2)   
price 0.088 0.088
(5.94)** (5.95)** 
e*EUAt -0.083 -0.083
(4.72)* (4.71)* 
gamma 0.043 -0.007
(0.16) (0.05) 
rquota 0.665
(2.88)** 
Weekday FE? YES YES 
Month FE? YES YES 
Year FE? YES YES 
Observations 64,548 64,548
Number of id 36 36
rule, temp, temp_max, 
temp_min, humid in MAD  Instruments 
Robust t statistics in parentheses clustered at the unit level 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: The fit of the theoretical rule to the actual allocation 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The non-linearity in the grand-fathered permits 
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Source: Own elaboration. 
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